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MEMORANDUM FOR: MI

Mr. Fisher flowe

Coordinator, National Policy Papers

Department of State

SUBJECT

: UNESCO Mational Policy Paper

1. The National Policy Paper on UNESCO has been reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency. We are in general agreement with the intelligence judgments on which the policy paper is based. We believe, however, that the paper fails to reflect properly the Seviet Intelligence exploitation of UNESCO and the use of UNESCO by Communist Front organizations for purposes detrimental to U.S. interests. We are attaching suggested language for incorporation into the paper. Agency officers are available to discuss these matters further if desired.

- 2. I also believe it would be useful for representatives of this Agency to participate in any Government-wide coordinating group on UNESCO that is established.
- 3. I have no comment to make on the broader aspects of U.S. policy toward UNESCO, these being outside the competence of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Zs Richard Helms

Richard Holms Director

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Intelligence

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SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE NATIONAL POLICY PAPER ON UNESCO

1. We suggest revision of the first section of page 19 as follows:

"Within the more recent past, open antagonism among these factions has partially subsided. Blatant Soviet apparatchiks and professional polemicists have been replaced in some cases by more serious scholars and scientists. Communist representatives continue to champion resolutions on behalf of 'peace' and 'disarmament,' but they have also been more forthcoming by joining other member states, including the U.S., in sponsoring and participating in specific projects, notably in the exact sciences. Presently, an atmosphere close to a de facto detente prevails.

"While UNESCO most certainly benefits from this uncertain lull in Communist cold war propaganda, there is no reason to believe that the objectives of Soviet intelligence regarding UNESCO have changed. There remains a significant percentage of identified intelligence officers in UNESCO Secretariat and Delegation positions and we can assume there are others as yet unidentified. We note, for example, that the linguistic and professional competence level of many Soviet employees of the Secretariat is rather low. Inattention and indifference toward their UNESCO jobs are traits commonly manifested by certain of them, suggesting that their UNESCO job may serve as cover for other interests. Moreover. in the prevailing and inherently desirable atmosphere of detente, these officers have greater ease of association with American and Western scientists and other intellectuals for intelligence purposes. Increased participation in specific projects, particularly when such projects take place in Western and less developed countries, offers excellent cover for travel to these areas.

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"In short, it must be recognized that Soviet intelligence exploitation of UNESCO remains a reality despite the present Soviet tactical attitude with regard to the functioning of the organization. This circumstance need not, however, prevent our taking advantage of that tactical attitude in the more effective pursuit of UNESCO objectives."

We would suggest adding after the second sentence of the second paragraph on page 18 the following:

"The various Communist front organizations which have consultative status (WFTU, IADL, WIDF) have over the years been successful in increasing their participation and have used UNESCO as an excellent anti-U.S. political action vehicle to:

- Raise political issues embarrassing to the U.S. or on which it is vulnerable.
- b. Delay the normal workings of UNESCO, and accord on programs between a majority of participating countries, by injection of extraneous, politicallyloaded issues.
- c. Increase their international prestige, particularly in prime Third World target countries, by being selected (and financed) by UNESCO to undertake programs in those countries.
- d. Operate under the cloak of respectability by engaging in joint programs with non-Communist organizations.
- e. Use the UNESCO Secretariat as a propaganda dissemination center."